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ABSTRACT

This study examined the effects of racial insult on the propensity to either
categorize or individuate outgroup members. Reaction times and self-reports
measures were employed to gauge reactions to an insulting video. White and
African American participants heard an insult, and then completed the Go/No-Go
Association Task (GNAT), as well as the Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice
Scale (IMS) and the External Motivation to Control Prejudice Scale (IMS), the
Motivation to Control Prejudice Scale (MCPRS) the Social Distance Scale (SDS),
and made ratings on a feeling thermometer about the people in the insult video.
African Americans showed more negative responses to outgroup members than
Whites on the explicit measure, but Whites showed more negative responses to
outgroup members than African Americans on the implicit measure.
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Introduction
Most people would probably prefer to think that their emotions do not
cloud their judgments of other people. Unfortunately, whether these personal
judgments are made about a stranger on trial for murder or a fellow classmate,
one’s feelings often shape how we view other people. In order to make the most
fair judgments of others it would be best to engage in slow, thoughtful bottom-up
processing every time we encounter someone new. However, that takes time,
and we usually rely on shortcuts to help speed the process of making social
judgments.
For the purposes of this paper, category-based responding refers to the
classification of a person based on his or her group membership. Stereotypes
refer to widely held beliefs that are specific to certain outgroups, and are
generally negative. Prejudice refers to negative attitudes toward certain outgroup
members. Discrimination refers to differential behaviors toward different outgroup
members.
For many years, the role of affect in social categorization has been of
interest to social psychologists. For instance, Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie and
Milberg (1987) found that a person’s likelihood of relying on category-based
information as opposed to attribute-based or individuating information depends in
part on the configuration of available information. The central question of this
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thesis is, when making judgments about another who belongs to another social
category, how does affect influence the extent to which a person will rely on more
superficial information, instead of forming an individualized impression? Such
superficial information could include mere ingroup/outgroup distinctions (e.g.,
“We must be better than them”), evaluative associations, (e.g., “They are
dangerous”), or stereotypes (e.g., “People in group X drink too much”). Three
different theoretical models have emerged from this line of research: the affectand-information-processing model (Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Kramer,
& Süsser, 1994) the mood-and-general-knowledge (MAGK) model (Bless,
Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996) and the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) (Forgas, 1994).
The first model emphasizes factors that affect processing capacity and lead to
more or less stereotyping, the second deals more with a person’s reliance on
general knowledge structures, and the third model emphasizes situational
demands. Stereotyping is considered useful in terms of being a strategy that
simplifies interactions within a complex social environment (Bodenhausen, 1993).
To make sense of a world where one is constantly bombarded with social
information, reliance on category information help facilitate decision-making. In
any intergroup situation where a social judgment is to be made, stereotypes are
automatically activated from memory (Devine, 1989). Thus, stereotyping has
been the focus of many investigations on the effects of affect on superficial
processing.
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Three Models of the Effects of Affect
Affect-and-Information-Processing Model. According to the affect-andinformation-processing model, whether the perceiver chooses to rely on those
categorizations to make a social judgment can be determined by a person’s
affect at the time (Bodenhausen, 1993). A person’s mood can affect both
motivation and processing capacity. If a person’s processing capacity is
compromised, the likelihood that he or she will rely on category information
increases.
Before they examined the effects of specific mood states, researchers
focused on the impact of arousal on the use of category-based responding. For
example, Bodenhausen (1990) found that reliance upon social stereotypes is
greater at the lower portions of the circadian arousal cycle. In that study,
participants were identified as “morning types” or “evening types” and were
instructed to judge the likelihood of a person’s guilt in an allegation of student
misconduct. Those who self-identified as morning types made more stereotypic
judgments in the afternoon or evening, when their arousal levels were low, than
they did in the morning, whereas those who self-identified as evening types
made more stereotypic judgments in the morning, when their arousal levels were
low. Conversely, Kim and Baron (1988) found that heightened arousal led to
greater reliance on stereotypes. High arousal was induced through exercise, and
highly aroused participants were more likely to overestimate the frequency of
stereotypic word pairs. The findings that both too much and too little arousal
decreases processing capacity and leads to more stereotyping is in line with
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what is known from earlier work in cognitive psychology (e.g. Hasher & Zacks,
1979).
Given that both high and low arousal states have been demonstrated to
lead to more stereotyping, let us consider affective valence more specifically. For
negative affect, it is helpful to consider three types of emotion: fear or anxiety,
anger, and sadness. Several studies have shown that anxiety reduces
processing capacity and performance (Darke, 1988; Gur et al., 1988) and
promotes less systematic thinking in the processing of persuasive arguments
(Baron, Burgess, Kao, & Logan, 1990).
Although it seems intuitive to think that angry people are less rational and
more likely to rely on stereotypes than systematic thought, there is very little
evidence to support this idea (Bodenhausen, 1993). A few studies have
examined the effects of anger caused by insult in intergroup situations. Baron
(1979) found a link between insult and aggressive behavior. He found that when
White participants were not insulted, African American targets received less
aggression than White targets. However, when they were insulted, participants
displayed similar levels of aggression toward both White and African American
targets. Using a similar paradigm, Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981) showed that
White participants who received no insult were less aggressive to African
American than White targets. This pattern was reversed in the insult condition.
Whites who had been insulted expressed more aggression against African
American than White targets.
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In much of the research involving the impact of sadness on performance,
sad participants do not show performance deficits. Sad participants have been
shown to be more accurate and show the least halo bias on a performance
appraisal task compared to happy participants (Sinclair, 1988). Similarly, sad
participants report more accurate detection of testimonial inconsistencies when
compared to happy people (Semmler & Brewer, 2002). Gotlib, McLachlin, and
Katz (1998) demonstrated that sad participants employed more systematic
information-processing strategies in a visual attention task. Finally, sad people
rely more on individuating information than happy people when performing an
impression formation task (Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996). In light of the
findings that too much arousal is related to reduced processing capacity, the
findings for anxiety versus sadness make sense. Anxiety involves more
physiological arousal than sadness, which has a disruptive effect on
performance, which leads to the use of simpler strategies, and which may involve
stereotypes (Bodenhausen, 1993). Additionally, Edwards and Weary (1993)
found that nondepressed participants were more likely to rely on category
membership information than depressed participants, who seemed to analyze
the individuating information more carefully. However, Ellis and Ashbrook (1998)
found that memory performance was impaired as a result of depressed mood
states. They theorized that depressed individuals are more likely to ruminate
about the causes of their sadness, and this rumination uses up processing
capacity, leading these individuals to rely on heuristic strategies.
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Unlike negative affect, it is not so useful to break down positive affect into
different types. The prototypical positive emotion is happiness (Bodenhausen,
1993). Positive emotion has been shown to lead to less systematic thought in a
number of studies. Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that participants in a happy
mood rated a male target more guilty when he was identified as a member of a
group that is stereotypically associated with the offense than when he was not. In
other research, people in a happy mood were found to be more likely to rely on
heuristic group category information in low-relevance intergroup situations
(Forgas & Fiedler, 1996).
When considering the proposition that dealing with social information that
is inconsistent with stereotypes uses a great deal of cognitive resources (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991), it follows that the reduction of processing capacity should lead to
more superficial processing of category members. However, one also needs to
consider the motivational component. If individuals are willing to allocate
sufficient resources to process stereotype inconsistent information, the
inconsistent information should be particularly salient (Bless, 2000). Forgas
(1989) found that happy people relied on heuristics when the outcome of their
decision was not personally relevant, but given proper motivation, they can
become more systematic. Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, and Strack (1990) showed
that happy people can scrutinize arguments if given specific instructions to do so,
but without explicit instruction they generally choose not to. Finally, Mackie and
Worth (1989) showed that happy participants examined persuasive arguments as
systematically as neutral participants when they were given ample time to do so,
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but not under time-limited conditions. Schwarz (1990) proposed that when a
person is in a happy mood, it is a signal that things are going well and there is no
pressing need to exert unnecessary cognitive effort. However, when a person is
in a sad mood, it is a signal that the situation is problematic, and that motivates a
person to try to change the situation. To bring about effective change, the person
must get an accurate representation of the situation, which can be achieved by
carefully processing incoming information.
With respect to the current study, eliciting negative affect that is related to
a person’s race should decrease processing capacity while simultaneously
reducing a person’s motivation to avoid relying on racial category information.
Thus, I hypothesized that the reactions of the participants would be consistent
with the Affect-and-information processing model. However, two other models
should be considered as well. Both could provide a framework for explaining how
people will react to a racial insult: the Mood and General Knowledge (MAGK)
model, and the Affect Infusion Model (AIM).
Mood and General Knowledge (MAGK) Model. In contrast to the affectand-information processing model, the MAGK model focuses less on processing
capacity, but more on a person’s knowledge about his or her environment. In
Bless et al.’s (1996) original formulation of the model, the simplified processing
strategies exhibited by happy people are not due to reduced-processing
motivation or capacity but to increased confidence in their general knowledge
structures. A person’s general knowledge structures include stereotypic
information that is activated automatically. The major difference between the
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MAGK and the affect as information models is that in the MAGK, a person’s
mood does not affect a person’s general motivation to engage in or to avoid
cognitive processing. This theory posits that reliance on general knowledge
structures is an antecedent of simplified processing, rather than a consequence.
Consistent with the MAGK model is research showing that happy people
perform better than sad or neutral people on creativity or problem-solving tasks
(Isen, 1987) and on concentration tasks (Bless, Clore et al., 1996). For example,
in the latter study, participants completed a primary and secondary task
simultaneously. The first task assessed reliance on stereotypes while the second
task assessed concentration. The happy participants performed worse than sad
participants on the primary task in that they had better recognition memory for
stereotypical information. However, the happy participants also performed better
than sad participants on the secondary concentration task. Because the happy
people expended cognitive resources on the secondary task, the argument that
happiness causes a reduction in processing capacity does not apply. According
to Bless, Clore et al. (1996) a positive affective state signals a benign
environment in which the simple reliance on general knowledge structures is
adaptive and appropriate. Therefore, happy people will have greater confidence
in their general knowledge structures. However, negative affect suggests a
problematic situation in which reliance on general knowledge structures may be
risky. Therefore, sad people will tend to focus on situational information instead.
Affect Infusion Model. A third way of organizing research findings about affect
and processing capacity is the Affect Infusion Model (AIM), which was introduced
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by Forgas (1994). The term affect infusion refers to the process whereby a
person’s affect influences a person’s judgmental processes. This theory outlines
certain situations where affect infusion is likely to occur. The strategies of direct
access and motivated processing should not elicit affect infusion, whereas the
strategies of heuristic processing and substantive processing should be more
likely to produce affect infusion. In the case of direct access, the task at hand is
well known and familiar, so a preexisting reaction based on stored information
can be directly retrieved. Affective states are not likely to interfere with a person’s
judgments in this situation. According to Forgas (2000), motivated processing
involves highly selective and targeted search strategies, which are guided by a
specific motivational objective, and affect infusion is again not likely. Heuristic
processing occurs when there is no stored information and no motivational goal
to guide judgments. In this situation, affect infusion is more likely to occur,
especially if the task is simple, is of low personal relevance, or if cognitive
capacity is limited. Substantive processing occurs when people process novel
information that is related to preexisting knowledge. In this situation, affect
infusion may occur whereby affect can act as a prime which produces selective
access to certain memories or thoughts. Like the other models, the AIM predicts
that positive affect should lead to more top-down, heuristic processing, whereas
negative affect should lead to more bottom-up, data driven processing. However,
the major difference in the AIM is that the consequences of the type of affect
being experienced are secondary to the demands of the situation.
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The Source of Affect: Incidental or Integral?
Bodenhausen (1993) made a distinction between two types of affect.
Integral affect involves the emotions elicited by the social group itself and the
usual conditions and contexts with which the group is associated. These are
underlying emotions that are always present and become quickly activated by the
imagined or actual presence of an outgroup member. Incidental affect involves
emotions elicited by situations unrelated to the intergroup context, such as
anxiety not elicited by the outgroup in question. Most of the literature discussed
to this point employed incidental rather than integral affect.
In most studies that have examined whether mood states are artificially
induced or not, the affective state is incidental. In other words, the moods of the
participants were not induced by thinking about or having contact with an
outgroup member. Perhaps part of the reason behind the muddled understanding
of affect on social categorization effects is that researchers have not considered
the effects of integral affect. The mood of the participants is generated by forces
not relevant to the outgroup. Not all people in happy moods are happy for the
same reason, and not all sad people are experiencing sadness for the same
reasons. This variability in experiences might be contributing to the varied effects
of affect on social categorization processing.
By turning attention to the effects of integral affect, the current study seeks
to further demystify the processes underlying affect and social categorization.
How does a person’s mood affect processing of social categories if the mood
was induced from the outgroup itself? Whereas it is true that incidental affect
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alone is sufficient to produce increased reliance on superficial information, such
as stereotypes, integral affect should provide a point of focus for participants.
What happens when an outgroup member is responsible for someone’s negative
affect? Will a person’s level of motivation to control prejudice affect whether
integral affect leads to increased reliance on superficial processing? These are
questions that the current study sought to answer.
Anti-White Attitudes
Category-based responding can involve prejudice as well as stereotypes.
Cacioppo and Berntson (2001) presented an explanation for racial prejudice that
is different from the idea that it is a natural side effect of cognitive processing.
They suggested that prejudice is classically conditioned from the time we are
children. According to the authors, media presentations that pair minority group
members with negative or frightening events serve to condition greater prejudice
in majority group members. This explanation for prejudice suggests that negative
affect is stored directly in memory, not through stereotypes. Because there are
not many widely held negative stereotypes about White Americans, it seems
reasonable to apply Cacioppo and Berntson’s (2001) conditioning theory to
explain negative feelings that African Americans hold toward whites. Although
media images may account for prejudiced feelings Whites have toward African
Americans, it does not explain the reverse effect. I would speculate that African
Americans view White Americans as adversarial, concerned with preventing the
advancement of African Americans in our society. Following from social
psychological image theory (Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999), African
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Americans typically perceive Whites in terms of an “enemy” image, which is
characterized by such qualities as hostility, untrustworthiness, and equal status.
Alternatively, Whites could be perceived by African Americans in terms of a
“barbarian” image, which is characterized by qualities like higher status,
ruthlessness, and irrationality. If an African American child is exposed to these
kinds of anti-white attitudes from family and social group, the classical
conditioning explanation can still be more useful than an explanation that puts
the focus on stereotypes.
Association and Generalization of Category-Based Responding
Studies by Stewart and her colleagues (Stewart, Doan, Gingrich, and
Smith, 1998, Stewart, in preparation) examined conditions under which trait
judgments made about a behavior were more likely to influence later judgments
of the behavior. These studies demonstrated that a person’s chronic level of
prejudice had an effect on whether he or she was prone to stereotype
association or generalization. Participants viewed photographs that were paired
with behaviors that were either stereotypical of African Americans or neutral at
Time 1. At Time 2, photographs of the same and different individuals as Time 2
were presented, again with behavioral information. Response times were
assessed for making a yes/no decision about whether the behavior was likeable.
High prejudice Whites were the most likely to generalize stereotypic judgments
from one African American at Time 1 to other African Americans at Time 2. Low
prejudice Whites, however, made the fastest associations for the same person
with the same behavior between Time 1 and Time 2. To explain these effects,
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the authors suggested that low prejudice Whites are more likely to individuate
African Americans, while high prejudice Whites rely on category representations.
Results were mixed for African American participants. In the first set of
experiments (Stewart et al., 1998), African Americans showed faster associations
for repeated behaviors with the same person regardless of the race of the target.
Similar to low prejudice Whites, African American participants were individuating
both African American and White targets. However, in the second set of
experiments (Stewart, in preparation), African Americans showed faster
associations for repeated behaviors with the same person only with White
targets. In this case, African Americans individuated White targets more than
African American targets.
The present study applied Stewart et al.’s (1998) concepts of stereotype
association and generalization within an insult paradigm. Angry mood was
induced by a videotaped insult. Category-based responding was assessed by a
cognitive reaction time measure. To assess implicit social evaluation the Go/NoGo Association Task (GNAT) was used. The GNAT is used to assess implicit
attitudes, but unlike the Implicit Attitude Task (IAT), it is not necessary to have
two contrasting categories. The GNAT has been shown to measure automatic
preferences with more flexibility than the IAT (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). The current
study also tried to clarify the conflicting results produced by African American
participants in the Stewart studies. With the addition of a measure of anti-White
attitudes, I hoped to determine whether African Americans who differed on this
scale would differ on their propensity to individuate targets.
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To incorporate Stewart et al.’s (1998) concepts in an affective insult
framework, the current study followed up on a study that examined the role of
displaced affect resulting from racial insult (McCord, Vanman, Rogers, Strong, &
Anderson 2004). In that study, the authors looked at the effects of anger caused
by insult on explicit behavioral indicators of prejudice. The purpose of the study
was to see whether negative affect induced by an outgroup member would be
displaced on a different target from the same outgroup. White and African
American participants viewed one of two sets of videotaped segments. One set
of segments served the purpose of evoking group anger relevant to prejudice. In
that condition, students on the videotape who were not the same race as the
participant made disparaging comments about people of the same race as the
participant. The second set of videotaped segments served the purpose of
evoking group anger not relevant to prejudice. In this second condition, students
on the videotape who were presumably students from another university made
disparaging comments about students who attended the university where the
participants were enrolled. After viewing one of the two sets of videos,
participants completed an interview with a second experimenter who was not the
same race as the participant. Analyses revealed that Whites lower in motivation
to control prejudice spoke longer, were less friendly and made more speech
hesitations when in the race insult condition, whereas Whites high in motivation
to control prejudice showed no difference in their behavior compared to the
school insult condition. The authors speculated that these behaviors were
indicative of the participant’s discomfort. For instance, participants may have
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talked longer because they were more uncomfortable about the insult and were
trying to compensate for their feelings of discomfort. African American
participants did not show any differences between the conditions in their
behavior.
The current study also investigated differences between internal and
external motivations to control prejudice in whether or not a person relies on
category-based responding. The McCord et al. (2004) study relied on scores on
Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions (MCPR)
scale to determine whether White participants were low or high in their
motivations to control their prejudice. This measure divides motivations to control
prejudiced reactions into two subscales. The first is the concern with acting
prejudiced. This involves the desire to distance oneself from actions that might
be deemed prejudiced by oneself or others. The second is the restraint to avoid
dispute. This is characterized by the desire to inhibit the expression of thoughts
or feelings in order to avoid dispute with or about African Americans. However,
Dunton and Fazio (1997) noted that the items may not have been sufficient in
distinguishing internal and external motivations. In the present study, we
intended to further illuminate the reactions of high and low prejudiced participants
by examining scores on the subscales of the MCPRS. Plant and Devine (1998)
created the internal motivation to respond without prejudice scale (IMS) and the
external motivation to respond without prejudice scale (EMS). The IMS measures
propensity to respond without prejudice because of personal beliefs that
prejudice is wrong. The EMS, on the other hand, measures propensity to
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respond without prejudice because of societal expectations from a culture that
frowns upon prejudice. They found that Whites who scored high on the EMS but
low on the IMS were more likely to endorse stereotypes about African Americans
when responding privately as opposed to publicly. This suggests that people in
this subgroup may hold prejudiced beliefs but do not want to be seen as
prejudiced in an attempt to appear politically correct. Participants in McCord et al.
(2004) who were shown on the Dunton and Fazio (1997) scale to be low in their
motivation to control prejudice, yet talked longer than those found to be low
prejudiced on the same scale, could actually be a part of this high external, low
internal subgroup. Participants who scored high on both subscales were less
likely to endorse stereotypes and did not change their response strategies
whether reporting them publicly or privately. The people that comprise this
subgroup are motivated both by internal beliefs that being prejudiced is wrong
and external pressures to appear politically correct. This subgroup also spent the
most time on a task that ostensibly would help alleviate covert bias (Devine et al.
2002). This finding suggests a lack of confidence in the actual ability to control
their prejudice reactions. Participants who scored low on both subscales were
more likely to endorse the stereotypes whether reporting them publicly or
privately. These participants had prejudiced internal beliefs and were not
motivated by social norms to hide them.
The fourth subgroup of people, those who scored high on the IMS and low
on the EMS, was examined further in later studies (Devine et al., 2002). This
group demonstrated the lowest levels of race bias on an implicit measure than
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any other subgroup. Participants in this group also spent little time in the
prejudice reduction task (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002),
suggesting a greater confidence in their ability to control their prejudice. The
authors suggest that the reason for this finding is that these people are more selfdetermined in that their reasons for responding without prejudice reflect more
fully internalized motivations that are integrated into their self-concept. They
score low on the EMS because they place very little emphasis responding
without prejudice in order to gain approval from others. Instead, they act solely
on their internal beliefs that being prejudiced is wrong, and thus are less likely to
show bias on implicit measures of prejudice. Thus, to get a valid picture of
participants’ motivations to control prejudice, it is important that they complete
both the MCPR and the IMS and EMS.
This thesis sought to build on prior research in two important ways. First,
both White and African American participants were included. With the exception
of Stewart et al. (1998), most studies on stereotyping and prejudice exclude
African American participants. Perhaps this is a result of the difficulty in
identifying stereotypes about Whites and the lack of measures to determine the
prejudice level of African Americans. However, if one applies the conditioning
theory by Cacioppo and Berntson (2001), then anti-White attitudes can still be
measured regardless of whether stereotypes exist. Like White participants, I
expected that African American participants would also be more likely to use
category-based responding in some situations. To this end, I employed a
modified version of Bogardus’ (1933) Social Distance Scale (SDS) and Plant and
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Devine’s (1998) IMS and EMS, scales as well as Dunton and Fazio’s (1997)
MCPR scale for both White and African American participants.
The second way in which the current study builds on previous research is
through the use of integral affect. Most studies rely on incidental affect to induce
reliance on stereotypes. I believed that when negative affect is induced by the
outgroup itself, people who differed on the IMS and EMS would show different
response strategies. This was shown somewhat in the previous study by McCord
et al. (2004), and the current study sought to further clarify the processes
underlying the differential responses to insult.
The current study sought to understand the effect of integral affect created
by insult on explicit and implicit measures of racial bias on people who differ in
their motivations to control racial prejudice. To assess implicit bias, the GNAT
was used. A feeling thermometer was included to assess explicit bias. I predicted
that participants who are low on the IMS would be more likely to generalize
stereotypic judgments from African Americans at Time 1 (video) to other African
Americans at Time 2 (GNAT or EMG). I expected to see that in the insult
condition, low IMS participants would show more negative affect toward all
outgroup members on both explicit and implicit measures than low IMS
participants. I also predicted that participants who are high on the IMS would not
show this generalization effect. When insulted, I expected that high IMS
participants would show stronger associations by displaying more implicit
negative affect toward the insulter. I did not expect to find any differences
between White and African American participants.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 157 students at Georgia State University (63 male, 94
female, 56 African American, 101 White) who were recruited from an introductory
psychology class and who received course credit for their participation. Students
were told that the study was concerned with basic psychological and
physiological processes involved when people look at photos and watch
videotapes of other people.
Materials
Insult video. One half of the participants viewed a tape with two insulting
racial outgroup members and one neutral racial ingroup member. Each person
spoke for 1-2 minutes, ostensibly about what they liked and disliked about being
a student at the university. The racial outgroup members each made a comment
insulting the participant’s race (e.g. “One problem I have with all of the
(White/Black) students here is that they seem to think that they are better than
everybody else”). The other half of the participants viewed a neutral video with
two racial outgroup members and one racial ingroup member. In this video, no
insults or mention of race was present. All actors in the videotapes were female
volunteers.
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GNAT implicit bias task. Participants were asked to make category
decisions about words and African American and White faces on a computer
screen using a keyboard. Within each block, the participant had to press a key
when they saw a stimulus that fit in either of two particular categories. For
instance, in one block, they were asked to press the space bar if they saw a
“good” (positive valence) word or an African American face. If the stimulus fit in
neither of these categories, the participant was instructed to do nothing. In other
blocks, the participant had to press the space bar if they saw a “bad” (negative
valence) word or an African American face, a good word or a White face, and a
bad word or a White face. The time it took to make these decisions was
recorded. Each of the four blocks consisted of four photographs and four words.
A total of 16 photographs were presented to each participant in this task.
Participants in the insult condition saw two still photographs of each of the two
outgroup insulters from the video. They also saw four photographs of a novel
outgroup member. Four photographs of the neutral ingroup member from the
video were presented. Four photographs of a novel ingroup member were also
presented. Participants in the no insult condition saw two photographs each of
the two neutral outgroup members from the video. They also saw four
photographs of a novel outgroup member. Four photographs of the neutral
ingroup member from the video were presented. Finally, four photographs of a
novel ingroup member were shown.
IMS and EMS. These two scales were completed by participants to
assess their motivations to respond without prejudice internally (e.g. “I attempt to
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act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important
to me”) or externally (e.g. “Because of today’s PC standards I try to appear
nonprejudiced toward Black people”). Ratings were made on a nine-point scale.
MCPR. This scale was completed by participants to assess their concern with
acting prejudiced (e.g. “It’s important to me that other people not think I’m
prejudiced” and their restraint to avoid dispute (e.g. “If I were participating in a
class discussion and a student of another race expressed an opinion with which I
disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own viewpoint”). Ratings were
made on a seven-point scale.
Feeling thermometer. This scale assessed participants’ explicit attitude
toward individual ingroup and outgroup members. For each photograph,
participants were asked to rate that person on a thermometer that runs from 0 to
100 degrees. A rating above 50 means that the participant feels favorable and
warm toward the person. A rating below 50 means that the participant feels
unfavorable and cool toward the person. A rating right at the 50 degree mark
means the participant doesn't feel particularly warm or cold.
SDS. This scale assessed participants’ overall explicit race bias. Participants
were asked to rate their willingness to have various social relationships with
White or Black Americans (e.g. next-door neighbor, governor, romantic date).
Ratings were made on a nine point scale.
Procedure
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were asked to sign a consent
form. Then they were told that the purpose of the study was to increase our
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understanding of the differences in the reactions people have when they view
photos of people versus when they see moving images and hear sound in a
videotape. The participants then watched a video in which “Atlanta area students
are talking about their experiences as a student in Atlanta.” The actual purpose
of the videos was to induce anger relevant to prejudice for half of the participants.
The other half watched a neutral videotape with no insult.
The participants completed the GNAT implicit bias computer task. This
task was comprised of two blocks of 50 trials each. The participant was asked to
quickly make a category decision about words or faces of both ingroup and
outgroup members on a computer screen. Some of the photos were of the same
person who delivered an insult on the video. The computer program measured
the RT for making the judgment. The participant also rated the person in each
photograph on the feeling thermometer.
After completing the implicit bias task, the participant completed the SDS,
IMS, EMS, and MCPR scales.
Following the experiment, participants were fully debriefed and the true
purpose of the experiment was revealed. The experimenter also explained why
deception was necessary in this investigation. None of the participants indicated
distress over being deceived by the experimenter.

23

Results
For all analyses, alpha was .05, and two-tailed tests were used.
Self-Report Measures
Insult manipulation check. Pilot testing of the insult video showed that those who
watched the insult video were more angry, frustrated, annoyed and irritated than
those who saw a no-insult video, as determined by their scores on an emotional
response questionnaire (Table 1). Those who watched the insult video also rated
the ambiguous actions of a fictional character, “Donald” from “The Donald Story”
(Srull & Wyer, 1979), as more inconsiderate (M = 8.94, SD = 1.21) than those
who saw a no insult video (M = 7.33, SD = 2.12), t(45.72) = -3.61, p = .001.
IMS and EMS scores. Participants made ratings on the IMS (α = .81) and EMS
(α = .80) on 9-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly
agree). Appropriate items were reverse-scored. Consistent with Devine et al.
(2002), participants’ scores on the IMS and EMS were averaged within each
scale. Therefore, scores range from 1 to 9, with higher scores indicating higher
levels of the motivation assessed by each scale. Participants were divided into
high and low levels of each motivation based on median splits of the IMS (Mdn =
7.2; high IMS, M = 8.03; low IMS, M = 5.83) and EMS (Mdn = 4.4; high EMS, M =
5.93; low EMS = 3.33). A race difference was found for the EMS, but not the IMS
or MCPRS. White participants (M = 4.77, SD = 1.57) had higher scores on the
EMS than African American participants (M = 4.21, SD = 1.58), t(155) = -2.14, p
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Table 1
Pilot participants’ responses to Emotional Response Questionnaire
Item

M

Mean Diff.

SD

No insult

Insult

No insult

Insult

Sad

1.50

1.48

.63

.81

.02

Angry

1.17

1.87

.46

.95

-.70*

Frustrated

1.50

2.23

.73

.92

-.73*

Gloomy

1.57

1.65

.73

.92

-.08

Down

1.40

1.65

.62

.91

-.25

Annoyed

1.13

2.45

.43

1.23

-1.32*

Irritated

1.27

2.32

.52

1.22

-1.05*

Notes: Responses were made on a scale from 1 to 5. Items marked with an
asterisk (*) were significant at the p < .01 level.
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= .034. The IMS and EMS scores of the participants in the insult condition did not
differ from the scores of participants in the no-insult condition. African Americans’
EMS scores had a reliability of Cronbach’s α = .76.
MCPRS scores. Participants made ratings on the MCPRS (α = .76) on a 7-point
scale ranging from -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). These scores
were transformed to positive numbers and appropriate items were reversescored. Participants’ scores were averaged, so that scores ranged from 1 to 7,
with higher scores indicating a higher motivation to control prejudiced reactions.
Participants were divided into high and low levels of motivation based on a
median split (Mdn = 4.24; high MCPRS, M = 4.85; low MCPRS, M = 3.68). The
MCPRS scores of the participants in the insult condition did not differ from the
scores of participants in the no-insult condition.
SDS scores. Participants made ratings on the SDS White (α = .95) and the SDS
African American (α = 1.00) on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 9 (strongly agree). Scores for each item were totaled for each participant and
higher scores indicate more willingness to interact with a person of the
corresponding race.
Index scores were computed for Social Distance Scale scores. Social
Distance Scale scores gauging willingness to interact with African Americans
were subtracted from scores gauging willingness to interact with Whites. Higher
scores indicated more bias toward Whites. The SDS index scores of the
participants in the insult condition did not differ from the scores of participants in
the no-insult condition.
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Main Analyses
A 2 (Race: African American or White) X 4 (IMS-EMS: High IMS-High
EMS, High IMS-Low EMS, Low IMS-High EMS, or Low IMS-Low EMS) analysis
of variance (ANOVA) was computed for Social Distance Scale index scores.
There was a main effect of race on Social Distance Scale index scores F(1, 147)
= 4.69, p = .03. African Americans (M = -36.25, SE = 14.08) showed more bias
toward African Americans, whereas Whites (M = 1.15, SE = 10.02) showed less
bias toward African Americans.
A significant Race X IMS-EMS interaction was also found for Social
Distance Scale scores, F (3, 147) = 2.98, p = .03. In the High IMS, Low EMS
subgroup, African Americans (M = -8.96, SE = 20.71) showed more bias toward
African Americans, whereas Whites (M = 4.35, SE = 21.18) showed more bias
toward Whites. A similar pattern of results was found for the Low IMS, Low EMS
subgroup. African Americans in this group (M = -25.78, SE = 28.67) showed
more bias toward African Americans, whereas Whites (M = 11.08, SE = 19.87)
showed more bias toward Whites. For both High EMS subgroups, no significant
differences were found between African American and White participants.
Preliminary analyses failed to show differences among the four IMS-EMS
subgroups on either explicit feeling ratings or implicit reaction time responses to
the photographs. This variable was subsequently excluded from further analyses.
A 2 (Race: African American or White) X 3 (Target: Target, Outgroup or Ingroup)
X 2 (Insult: Insult or No Insult) multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
computed for both explicit feeling ratings and implicit reaction time ratings.
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There was a main effect of insult on explicit feeling ratings of the target,
F(1, 152) = 15.94, p < .001. Higher ratings on the feeling thermometer indicate
more warm or positive feelings about the person being rated. The no-insult group
(M = 5.32, SD = 1.07) rated all pictures on average (combining target, outgroup,
and ingroup) significantly higher on the feeling thermometer than the insult group
(M = 4.71, SD = 1.22) t(155)=3.40, p = .001).
For feeling ratings, an Insult X Target interaction was found, F(2, 152) =
65.97, p < .001. As can be seen in Figure 1, those who were insulted rated the
target (M = 3.94, SD = 1.96) more negatively than those who were not insulted
(M = 6.47, SD = 1.39) t(155) = 9.29, p < .001. Those who were insulted also
rated the target more negatively than the both the outgroup (M = 5.05, SD =
1.42) t(78) = -5.02 and the ingroup (M = 5.13, SD = 1.47) t(78) = -4.86. Those
who were not insulted rated the target more positively than both the outgroup (M
= 4.76, SD = 1.36) t(77) = 9.77, p < .001 and the ingroup (M = 7.73, SD = 1.93)
t(77) = 8.01, p < .001.
For feeling ratings, an Insult X Race interaction was also found, F(1, 152)
= 6.93, p = .01. As shown in Figure 2, when not insulted, African Americans and
Whites rated all pictures the same overall. When insulted, Whites’ and African
Americans’ overall ratings are not significantly different, but when insulted,
Whites rate pictures more positively (M = 4.97, SD = 1.15) than African
Americans (M = 4.31 SD = 1.22) t(77) = -2.40 (p = .019). Insulted African
Americans rate the pictures less positively (M = 4.31, SD = 1.22) than African
Americans who were not insulted (M = 5.53, SD = 1.06) t(54) = 3.94, p < .001.
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Figure 1
Figure 1 caption: Insult X Target interaction: Feeling ratings as a function of
target and insult.
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Figure 2
Figure 2 caption: Insult X Race interaction: Feeling ratings as a function of insult
and race.
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For feeling ratings, a Target X Race interaction was found F(2, 152) =
6.02, p = .003. As can be seen in Figure 3, Whites rated the target more
positively (M = 5.54, SD = 1.93) than did African Americans (M = 4.59, SD =
2.31) t(155) = -2.77, p = .006. White participants rated the target more positively
than they rated both the outgroup (M = 4.92, SD = 1.35) t(100) = 2.90, p = .005,
and the ingroup (M = 4.83, SD = 1.48) t(100) = 3.04, p = .003.
Reaction times were measured in milliseconds (ms). Index scores were
computed for reaction times. For each group (target, outgroup and ingroup) the
RT for that group paired with negative words was subtracted from the RT for that
group paired with positive words. Higher (longer) RT index scores mean more
negative associations for that group.
For RT index scores, a Target X Race interaction was found, F (2, 152) =
5.44, p = .005. As can be seen in Figure 4, Whites reacted more negatively to the
target (M = 41.73, SD = 183.69) than did African Americans (M = -33.29, SD =
196.27) t(155) = -2.39, p = .018. Whites also reacted more positively to the
ingroup (M = -36.04, SD = 172.92) than African Americans (M = 26.11, SD =
181.27) t(155) = 2.12, p = .036. For Whites, reactions to the target were more
negative (M = 41.73, SD = 183.69) than reactions to the ingroup (M = -36.04, SD
= 172.92) t(100) = 3.21, p = .002, and reactions to the outgroup were more
negative (M = 34.77, SD = 172.60) than reactions to the ingroup t(100) = 2.73, p
= .007.
Gender Differences. A 2 (Race: African American or White) X 3 (Target:
Target, Outgroup or Ingroup) X 2 (Insult: Insult or No Insult) X 2 (Gender: Male or
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Figure 3
Figure 3 caption: Target X Race interaction: Feeling ratings as a function of
Target and Race.
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Figure 4
Figure 4 caption: Target X Race interaction: Reaction times as a function of
target and race.

33
Female) MANOVA was computed for both explicit feeling ratings and implicit
reaction times. A significant Insult X Gender interaction was found for implicit
reaction time responses, F (1, 148) = 6.73, p = .01. As can be seen in Figure 5,
Men who were insulted reacted more positively (M = -48.49, SD = 118.98) than
women who were insulted (M = 21.71, SD = 113.81), t(77)= -2.64, p = .01. Men
who were insulted also reacted more positively than men who were not insulted
(M = 34.96, SD = 118.98), t(61) = 2.87, p = .006. No significant gender
differences were found for explicit feeling ratings.
MCPR Differences. A 2 (Race: African American or White) X 3 (Target: Target,
Outgroup or Ingroup) X 2 (Insult: Insult or No Insult) X 2 (MCPR Level: Low or
High) MANOVA was computed on RT scores. For RT index scores, an Insult X
MCPR Level X Target interaction was found, F(2,152) = 3.69, p = .026. As can
be seen in Figure 6, in the high MCPR group, those who were insulted
had more negative reactions to the outgroup (M = 31.83, SD = 209.05) than the
ingroup (M = -63.55, SD = 207.10), t(39) = 2.42, p = .02. For those who were not
insulted, people who had low MCPR (M = 79.89, SD = 183.86) reacted more
negatively to the outgroup than those who had high MCPR (M = -29.94,
SD=141.34), t(76)=2.84, p = .006.
EMS Differences. A 2 (Race: African American or White) X 3 (Target:
Target, Outgroup or Ingroup) X 2 (Insult: Insult or No Insult) X 2 (EMS Level: Low
or High) MANOVA was computed for explicit feeling ratings and implicit reaction
time ratings. A significant Race X EMS Level X Target interaction was found for
explicit feeling ratings, F (2, 148) = 4.38, p = .013. As can be seen in Figure 7,
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Figure 5
Figure 5 caption: Gender X Insult interaction: Reaction times as a function of
gender and insult.
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Figure 6
Figure 6 caption: Target X Insult X Motivation to Control Prejudice Level
Interaction. Reaction time as a function of target, insult and MCPR level.
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Figure 7
Figure 7 caption: Race X Target X EMS Level interaction: Feeling ratings as a
function of race, target and EMS level.
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Low EMS White participants rated the target significantly higher (M = 5.64,
SD = 1.94) than Low EMS African American participants (M = 4.4, SD = 2.30),
t(80) = -2.63, p = .01. Low EMS White participants also rated the target higher
than they rated both the outgroup (M = 4.79, SD = 1.02), t(46) = 2.93, p = .005,
and the ingroup (M = 4.62, SD = 1.36), t(46) = 2.99, p = .005. No significant
results were found for implicit reaction times in this analysis.
IMS Differences. A 2 (Race: African American or White) X 3 (Target: Target,
Outgroup or Ingroup) X 2 (Insult: Insult or No Insult) X 2 (IMS Level: Low or High)
MANOVA was computed for both explicit feeling ratings and implicit reaction time
ratings. A significant Race X IMS Level interaction was found for explicit feeling
ratings, F (1, 148) = 4.25, p = .041. As can be seen in Figure 8, High IMS Whites
rated all photographs on average more positively (M = 5.38, SD = 1.18) than
High IMS African Americans (M = 4.83, SD = 1.23), t(80) = -2.04, p = .045. In
addition, African Americans with low IMS scores rated the photographs more
positively (M = 4.90, SD = 1.43) than High IMS African Americans, t(99) = -2.46,
p = .016. No significant results were found for implicit reaction times in this
analysis.

38

Figure 8
Figure 8 caption: IMS Level X Race Interaction: Feeling ratings as a function of
IMS level and race
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Discussion
This study examined both explicit and implicit reactions to a prejudiced
insult as heard by both White and African American participants.
Examining race differences on the explicit measure of the feeling ratings, I
found that whereas both African American and White participants rated overall
the pictures less positively after insult, African Americans rated the pictures even
less positively than did Whites. This finding suggests that African Americans had
a stronger explicit reaction to racial insults than Whites. Alternatively, this finding
could point to the fact that Whites were trying to appear more egalitarian by not
rating the African American target as negatively as they actually felt. In line with
Gaertner and Dovidio’s (1986) view of aversive racism, these White participants
may have displayed ambivalence in this case, in that they believes it was wrong
to rate a person negatively based on his race, yet due to cultural and cognitive
forces, are not wholly able to separate negative feelings from their beliefs about
African Americans.
Manipulation checks demonstrated that pilot study participants were
affected by the insult video. Not surprisingly, insulted participants made much
lower explicit feeling ratings for all pictures than participants who were not
insulted. Insulted participants also rated the target lower than the outgroup and
the ingroup others. Because the target is the person who delivered the insult, this
suggests that participants were individuating the target by explicitly rating the
person who insulted them lower on the feeling thermometer. That the participants
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who were not insulted rated the target more positively than the outgroup
and ingroup is a finding that is less easily explained. It is possible that because
the target had been seen before, but the outgroup and ingroup pictures were
novel, mere exposure to the same image of the target twice caused the higher
ratings for that photo. In other words, familiarity with the subject of the photo was
sufficient to create more positive explicit feelings about that person. Future
investigations should include both novel and familiar photos of outgroup and
ingroup members for explicit ratings to better understand this finding.
A race difference was found for scores on the EMS but not the IMS.
Whites displayed a higher external motivation to control prejudice than African
Americans. This finding was interesting because previous studies had not
investigated responses by African Americans on either the EMS or IMS. The
finding that African Americans report lower levels of motivation to control
prejudice may be a reflection of differences in society’s standards for the display
of prejudice by Whites versus African Americans. Whereas Whites are
discouraged from displaying prejudice, the same standards are perhaps not
expected of African Americans.
Regardless of insult, African Americans rated the target more negatively
than did Whites. Referring to the mere exposure effect mentioned earlier, this
suggests that the mere exposure effect may only be happening for White
subjects. However, when looking at the implicit reaction time measure,
regardless of insult, Whites responded more negatively to the target than African
Americans and more positively to the ingroup than African Americans. Here it
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seems that Whites are relying on category information in judging the target. This
is in direct contrast with what was found on the explicit measures. Perhaps the
White subjects are overcompensating on the explicit measures by rating the
target more positively, but reacting more slowly when making positive
associations with the target on the GNAT. Meanwhile, the African Americans are
probably more used to hearing insults against their own race, and thus did not
show parallel negative responses to the target on the implicit measure. Yet,
African Americans demonstrated more negative responses on the explicit
measure. Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer & Kraus (1995) found that African Americans
rated Whites lower than Whites rated African Americans on a variety of explicit
measures. This might explain the differences on the explicit measures reported
here, as African Americans may have found that publicly expressing negative
views about Whites to be acceptable. However, for Whites, the public expression
of negative feelings for African Americans is not acceptable in American society,
and thus they hay have rated African Americans more positively, despite what
they were feeling internally. Again, there is a disparity in the standards expected
from Whites versus African Americans with regards to the display of prejudice.
Because African Americans seemed to have a less negative response on
the implicit measures, it appears that African Americans do not seem to be
affected by racial insult. Consistent with this interpretation is a study by D’Augelli
and Hershberger (1993), which found that of the African American college
students surveyed, 89% reported having heard disparaging racial remarks about
African Americans on their campus (41% reported having heard them
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occasionally, 28% reported having heard them often, and 28% reported having
heard them frequently). In the same sample, 59% of the participants reported
being the target of one or more of verbal insults. Given the prevalence of
experiences that African Americans have with racial insult, it may be the case
that they have had more practice developing coping strategies to deal with these
situations. It could be the case that African Americans are employing a coping
response by attributing the insult to prejudice, rather than to something about
oneself (Crocker & Major, 1989). In so doing, perhaps African Americans are
able to ignore the insult without letting it affect their subsequent psychological
responses.
African Americans did not differ in their reactions to the target, outgroup,
and ingroup, but Whites reacted more negatively to the outgroup than the
ingroup. It appears that Whites were demonstrating category-based responding
in this case. The target and outgroup were both members of the outgroup for
White participants. Further analyses showed that High EMS Whites were not
rating the target differently from the outgroup or ingroup, and thus were
individuating the people in the pictures. However, low EMS Whites rated the
target higher than African Americans rated the target, and also the low EMS
Whites rated the target higher than the outgroup and ingroup. This may suggest
that only low EMS Whites overcompensated by rating the target higher than
other pictures. Of course, there is still the possibility that the mere exposure
effect is in place when judging the targets, as this was the only photo that was
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familiar. However, if this were the case, it is unclear why the mere exposure
effect only affected White participants.
Race differences were found among the IMS-EMS subgroups on the
Social Distance Scale. In both Low EMS subgroups (Low EMS, High IMS and
Low EMS, Low IMS), African American and White participants showed a greater
willingness to interact with their own race as opposed to the other race. Because
the SDS is an explicit measure, and the EMS measures external motivation to
control prejudice, it is not surprising that these measures were found to be
related.
Further investigation is needed to understand why the implicit reactions of
Whites suggested reliance on category information, whereas the African
Americans did not. The behaviors of African Americans may have been
consistent with the MAGK model, rather than the Affect-and-Information
Processing model, as predicted. After being exposed to racial insult, these
participants may have realized that they were not in a benign environment, and
thus lacked confidence in their general knowledge structures, which may have
included negative beliefs about Whites. Thus, the negative mood may have
induced them to rely on more individuating information in their implicit responses
to this particular situation. Explicit responses by African Americans, where they
are lacking external pressure to have positive feelings about the outgroup, may
have been strong enough to override reliance on individuating information,
leading to the more negative explicit responses by African Americans toward
Whites.
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The behavior of White participants may have been more in line with the
Affect Infusion Model. According to this model, substantive processing occurs
when people are processing novel information, which has to be related to
preexisting knowledge. In this situation, affect infusion may occur whereby affect
can act as a prime that produces selective access to certain memories or
thoughts. Negative affect that was created by the outgroup may have caused
activation of memories of negative beliefs toward the outgroup, which resulted in
the more negative implicit responses by Whites. Explicit responses by Whites
showed the reverse effect of those of African Americans, in that the external
pressure to show positive attitudes toward the outgroup overrides the activation
of these negative beliefs, at least on explicit measures.
According to the continuum model of impression formation, there are
several factors that help determine whether a person will make a judgment based
on categorical or individuating information (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). Central
to determining how much a person will individuate another person is how much
attention is paid to the situation, as well as how they interpret the situation in line
with their motivations. According to the model, to fully individuate a target, a
person must first determine that the person is of minimal interest or relevance,
and then must allocate attention to the attributes of the target. If the person
interprets that the available information is inconsistent with category information,
the person must recategorize the target into a new category, but if unable to do
so, the person must then engage in piecemeal, attribute-by-attribute analysis of
the target because that person is not easily categorizable. If the person does not
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complete each of these stages in the model, the target will be judged according
to his category membership. It is not known from this study which stage along
this continuum White participants failed to complete, leading to categorical
responding. Individual and situational differences can create wide variation at any
one of these stages, and these differences were not sufficiently captured in this
experiment by assessing each participant’s Internal and External Motivations to
control prejudice. For African American participants, it is not known whether this
same model applies. If so, we can presume that African Americans were
successful at each stage of the continuum, but it is unclear why African
Americans would complete each stage whereas Whites did not.
Future experiments may examine effects of inducing either internal or
external motivation to control prejudice in a situational context in order to control
for the widely varying individual differences, and then attempt to see whether the
expected results are found in the induced IMS/EMS subgroups.
Another factor that may have contributed to not finding the expected
differences between the IMS/EMS subgroups is the difference in the population
from which this sample was drawn as compared to Plant and Devine’s (1998)
population. As seen in Table 2, the EMS scores of both Whites and African
Americans had a smaller range than the EMS scores found by Plant and Devine.
Plant and Devine used only White participants at a university (i.e., the University
of Wisconsin at Madison) that was not as diverse as Georgia State University.
The racial composition of the two schools may be so different from each other
that IMS and EMS scores may need to be treated differently in order to better
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Table 2 Caption: IMS and EMS scores in the current study compared to scores
found by Plant et al.
Table 2
IMS and EMS Score Averages
Score

African Americans

Whites

Plant

Low IMS

5.91

5.59

5.83

IMS Mdn.

7.40

7.00

7.20

High IMS

8.13

7.82

8.03

Low EMS

3.03

3.40

2.24

EMS Mdn

4.00

4.40

4.60

High EMS

5.46

5.96

7.03
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understand how they apply to students at a very diverse university. In addition,
the IMS and EMS have not been tested on African American populations, so it
was not established whether a difference in IMS and EMS levels would even be
found for African American participants.
Certain methodological limitations may have prevented the expected
results from being found. For example, one limitation may have been in the way
the photo stimuli were presented. Participants viewed one familiar photo of the
target, and one each of a novel outgroup member and a novel ingroup member.
Investigations should include stimuli representing both novel and familiar
outgroup and ingroup members to control for effects of mere exposure.
An investigation of possible gender effects was not considered part of the
primary analyses, but a gender difference was, indeed, found. On RT index
scores, women’s responses did not differ whether they were insulted or not, but
men responded more positively when they had been insulted. This suggests that
men perhaps were covering their negative responses and reporting inflated
feeling ratings so as not to appear prejudiced. This finding could have also
resulted from men not wanting to appear sexist, as in this experiment, women
provided the insults. Alternatively, in Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, and Schwarz’s
(1996) experiments investigating the southern culture of honor, it was found that
northern men were merely amused after they had been bumped into and insulted
by another man, while southern men were angered. In the Cohen et al. (1996)
study, men were the insulters, so perhaps it is the case that southern men might
only be angered if an insult came from a man, but amused if the insult was dealt
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by a women. The present study was conducted in the South, with women
delivering the insults. Therefore, it may be the case that the men in this study
were merely amused by the insult because it came from a woman instead of a
man, which may have caused the inflated feeling ratings.
People who had high levels of motivation to control prejudice showed an
interesting pattern of reaction time results. These participants reacted more
negatively to the target than the outgroup when they were not insulted. In this
instance, it seems that the mere exposure effect is operating in reverse, because
the familiar target received a more negative response than the novel outgroup.
Meanwhile, those with high MCPR who were insulted reacted more negatively to
the outgroup than the ingroup, even though it was the target who insulted them.
These participants, who are highly motivated to control their prejudice, might be
transferring their negative reactions to the outgroup member. Perhaps their
suppression of prejudice toward the target somehow “rebounds” when confronted
with the novel outgroup member.
Regardless of insult, when looking at the average of the target, outgroup,
and ingroup photos, High IMS African American participants made more negative
ratings than both High IMS White participants and Low IMS African American
participants. Because so little is known about African Americans’ responses on
the IMS, it is difficult to speculate why this finding occurred. It may be the case
that Low IMS African American are overcompensating and displaying inflated
feeling ratings.
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I did not find what I expected in terms of differences in association and
generalization on explicit and implicit measures among the IMS-EMS subgroups.
However, I did find unexpected race differences on the EMS, as well as race
interactions with the IMS and EMS that previously had not been investigated.
These results suggest that, despite what I predicted, on both implicit and explicit
measures, African-Americans and Whites respond differently to racial insult. This
is an important finding that should be explored further.
Contributions to the Study of Prejudice
This study involved Whites and African Americans both experiencing
prejudice and exhibiting prejudiced responses, while most prior research has
focused on Whites exhibiting prejudice and, to a lesser degree, African
Americans experiencing prejudice. Even though the expected results were not
detected, these topics deserve further attention to fully explain how racial insult
affects the prejudiced responses of both Whites and African Americans. Even
though a majority of the literature investigating prejudice and category-based
responding has focused on the examination of the behaviors of Whites, the
exhibition of these same types of behaviors by African Americans and other nonWhite populations should not be ignored. Further, in a society where there is a
significant amount of racial mixing, the experience of anti-White prejudice is a
reality, even if it is less common than anti-Black prejudice. To fully understand
the phenomena of prejudice and discrimination, all forms of these types of
behaviors should be investigated.
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In addition to taking a broader and more inclusive approach to the study of
behaviors related to discrimination and prejudice, this study also made use of
integral affect, wherein the induced affect was caused by the social group itself.
Prior research involving induced affect and social situations has typically
employed incidental affect, wherein affect is induced via methods that are
unrelated to the social group context. Because the study of social situations in a
laboratory setting has an element of artificiality, the use of integral affect in these
types of studies can make the situation seem more natural and realistic.
Ultimately, a greater understanding of the nature of prejudice may help reduce its
harmful effects in society. The examination of integral affect may prove very
useful in achieving this goal.
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Appendix A

Emotion Manipulation Check

Please describe the extent to which you are currently experiencing each of the
following emotions. Just circle the number that seems to best describe the
amount of each emotion.

Definitely Do Not Feel

Definitely Feel

Sad

1

2

3

4

Angry

1

2

3

4

Frustrated

1

2

3

4

Gloomy

1

2

3

4

Down

1

2

3

4

Annoyed

1

2

3

4

Irritated

1

2

3

4
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Appendix B

The Donald Story

I ran into my old acquaintance Donald the other day, and I decided to go over
and visit him, since by coincidence we took our vacations at the same time.
Soon after I arrived, a salesman knocked at the door, but Donald refused to let
him enter. He also told me that he was refusing to pay his rent until the landlord
repaints his apartment. We talked for a while, had lunch, and then went out for a
ride. We used my car, since Donald’s car had broken down that morning, and he
told the garage mechanic that he would have to go somewhere else if he couldn’t
fix his car that day. We went to the park for about an hour and then stopped at a
hardware store. I was sort of preoccupied, but Donald bought some small
gadget, and then I heard him demand his money back from the sales clerk. I
couldn’t find what I was looking for, so we left and walked a few blocks to another
store. The Red Cross had set up a stand by the door and asked us to donate
blood. Donald lied by saying he had diabetes and therefore could not give blood.
It’s funny that I hadn’t noticed it before, but when we got to the store, we found
that it had gone out of business. It was getting kind of late, so I took Donald to
pick up his car and we agreed to meet again as soon as possible.
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Now that you have read this story, please form an impression of Donald. Circle
the number which best describes Donald on the following traits:

Not at All

Extremely

Boring

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Unfriendly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Inconsiderate

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Interesting

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Likeable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Dependable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Narrow-minded

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Thoughtful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Kind

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Intelligent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Selfish

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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Appendix C

Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS) and External
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (EMS)

Instructions: The following questions concern various reasons or motivations
people might have for trying to respond in nonprejudiced ways toward people of
a different race. Some of the reasons reflect internal-personal motivations
whereas others reflect more external-social motivations. Of course, people may
be motivated for both internal and external reasons; we want to emphasize that
neither type of motivation is by definition better than the other. In addition, we
want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual responses. All
your responses will be completely confidential. We are simply trying to get an
idea of the types of motivations that students in general have for responding in
nonprejudiced ways. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you
respond to each of the questions openly and honestly. Please give your
response according to the scale below.

63

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

Internal Motivation Items

I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward people of a different race because
it is personally important to me.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

According to my personal values, using stereotypes about people of a different
race is OK.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward people of a
different race.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about people of
a different race is wrong.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Being nonprejudiced toward people of a different race is important to my selfconcept.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS) and External
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (EMS)

External Motivation Items

Because of today’s PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear
nonprejudiced toward people of a different race.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I try to hide any negative thoughts about people of a different race in order to
avoid negative reactions from others.
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

If I acted prejudiced toward people of a different race, I would be concerned that
others would be angry with me.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward people of a different race in order to
avoid disapproval from others.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I try to act nonprejudiced toward people of a different race because of pressure
from others.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Note: Participants were given the IMS and EMS items mixed together. The
questionnaire was labed “Personal Motivations Scale” for participants.
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Appendix D

Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (MCPRS)

Directions: For each statement below, write a number in the blank that indicates
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement. Please answer
honestly, remembering that your answers will be kept confidential. Please use
the following scale:

-3………….-2………….-1………….0………….+1………….+2………….+3
strongly

strongly

disagree

agree

______

1.

In today’s society it is important that one not be

perceived as prejudiced in any manner.

______

2.

I always express my thoughts and feelings, regardless

of how controversial they might be.

______

3.

I get angry with myself when I have a thought or

feeling that might be considered prejudiced.

______

4.

If I were participating in a class discussion and a

student of another race expressed an opinion with which
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I disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own
viewpoint.

______

5.

Going through life worrying about whether you might

offend someone is just more trouble than it’s worth.

______

6.

It’s important to me that other people not think I’m

prejudiced.

______

7.

I feel it’s important to behave according to

society’s standards.

______

8.

I’m careful not to offend my friends, but I don’t

worry about people I don’t know or don’t like.

______

9.

I think that it is important to speak one’s mind

rather than to worry about offending someone.

______

10.

It’s never acceptable to express one’s prejudices.

______

11.

I feel guilty when I have a negative thought or

feeling about a person of a different race.

______

12.

When speaking to a person of a different race, it’s

important to me that he/she not think I’m prejudiced.

68
______

13.

It bothers me a great deal when I think I’ve

offended someone, so I’m always careful to consider
other people’s feelings.
______

14.

If I have a prejudiced thought or feeling, I keep it

to myself.

______

15.

I would never tell jokes that might offend others.

______

16.

I’m not afraid to tell others what I think, even

when I know they disagree with me.

______

17.

If someone who made me uncomfortable sat next to me

on a bus, I would not hesitate to move to another seat.

Note: The questionnaire was labeled “Personal Attitudes Scale” for participants.
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Appendix E
Social Distance Scale
Sub# ________

The following questions ask about your perception of White Americans. You may have
to put yourself in different roles for some of the items (i.e. parent, spouse). Please rate
the following statement with each word listed below, using the 1-9 scale, 1=strongly
disagree to 9=strongly agree.

I would be willing to have a White American as my:

STRONGLY

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

AGREE

Good Friend

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Next Door Neighbor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Co-worker

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Roommate

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Child's Friend

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Sibling's spouse

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Romantic Date

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Family physician

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

U.S. President

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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Governor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Wife or Husband

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Child's teacher

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Dance partner

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Fellow church or
social club member

The following questions ask about your perception of Black Americans. You may have
to put yourself in different roles for some of the items (i.e. parent, spouse). Please rate
the following statement with each word listed below, using the 1-9 scale, 1=strongly
disagree to 9=strongly agree.

I would be willing to have a Black American as my:

STRONGLY

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

AGREE

Good Friend

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Next Door Neighbor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Co-worker

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Roommate

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Child's Friend

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

71
Sibling's spouse

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Romantic Date

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Family physician

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

U.S. President

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Governor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Wife or Husband

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Child's teacher

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Dance partner

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Fellow church or
social club member

Note: The questionnaire was labeled “Social Survey” for participants.

